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Abstract 
 
Using data on the ‘career’ paths of one thousand ‘leading scientists’ from 1450 
to 1900, what is conventionally called the ‘rise of modern science’ is mapped as 
a changing geography of scientific practice in urban networks. Four distinctive 
networks of scientific practice are identified. A primate network centred on 
Padua and central and northern Italy in the sixteenth century expands across 
the Alps to become a polycentric network in the seventeenth century, which in 
turn dissipates into a weak polycentric network in the eighteenth century. The 
nineteenth century marks a huge change of scale as a primate network centred 
on Berlin and dominated by German-speaking universities. These geographies 
are interpreted as core-producing processes in Wallerstein’s modern world-
system; the rise of modern scientific practice is central to the development of 
structures of knowledge that relate to, but do not mirror, material changes in the 
system. 
 
Keywords Modern science, Space of flows, Scientists, Scientific centres, 
Scientific practice, Urban, Networks 
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According to Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 2004a), the modern world-system 
emerged in the ‘long sixteenth century’ (ca. 1450-1650) as a European-based 
world-economy straddling the Atlantic. Its basic structure encompassed a 
division of labour that defined core and periphery zones of economic activity. 
During the long period of its establishment, the core zone moved from 
Mediterranean Europe to North West Europe reflecting the reorientation of 
Europe to the rest of the world. It is the processes that create and recreate the 
core zone that have generated the social changes which have ultimately led to 
the elimination of all alternative world-systems; by ca. 1900 the modern world-
system was effectively global in scope. One of these core processes has been 
what is conventionally known as the ‘rise of modern science’.  
 
As well as core-periphery spatial structures, world-systems analysis recognises 
structures of knowledge that have also changed in the unfolding of the modern 
world-system (Wallerstein 1999, 2004a, 2004b). The process that is identified 
as the ‘rise of modern science’ links these two structures.1 In other words, 
adopting a world-systems analysis approach enables us to integrate the stories 
of changing science and changing geography through the modern world-
system. The relevance of ‘science’ to social needs emanating from the endless 
accumulation of capital, the differentia specifica of the modern world-system, 
has encompassed both materialist reproduction (the work of science 
underpinning technology) and ideological reproduction (the idea of science 
underpinning progress).2 This has culminated in science dominating modern 
structures of knowledge through two successful challenges to ‘traditional 
knowledges’: first a secular challenge to religious authority inherited from 
medieval knowledge structures, and second an empirical challenge to the 
critical philosophical knowledge that replaced the sacred; by ca. 1900 
specialised scientific disciplines had been created in recognisably modern 
universities (Ben-David and Zloczower 1962; Wallerstein 2004b). This paper 
brings together these two parts of world-systems thinking, core-periphery and 
                                            
1 The term structure is used here to mean the slowly changing bases of the modern 
world-system from which processes emanate to constitute the historical system 
(Wallerstein 1974; Sayer 1992). 
2 According to Wallerstein (2004b, p. 7), ‘For very many, the label “scientific” and the 
label “modern” became virtually synonymous, and for almost everyone the label was 
meritorious’. 
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knowledge structures, by mapping the production of modern structures of 
knowledge through a detailed study of the changing geography of scientific 
practice in the modern world-system to 1900. We show it is a process located in 
the core of this world-system but its geography is always more complex than 
specification as simply core process indicates: sometimes scientific practice 
lags behind other core processes, at other times it is at the forefront of changes 
in core location.3 We draw upon the encyclopaedic researches of Robert 
Gascoigne (1984, 1987, 1992) for historical data to depict these geographies of 
science.  
 
In his historical demographic study of ‘modern science’, Gascoigne (1992) uses 
biographical data on 12,000 persons who practiced ‘science’ from the early 
thirteenth century through to 1900.4 The pattern of change he presents matches 
Wallerstein’s chronology of core zone changes: there is no growth of scientific 
activity through the medieval period but from sometime in the late fifteenth 
century onwards ‘science’ grows exponentially (Gascoigne 1992, p. 550). 
Furthermore, during the ‘long sixteenth century’, Italy initially grows to dominate 
in scientific activity but then stagnates to be ‘overtaken’ by England, France and 
                                            
3 Ben-David used a core-periphery model in his classic studies of the rise of modern 
science (Schott 1993, pp. 475-477); our world-systems analysis differs from his work 
through setting these structures, and therefore scientific practice as a core-making 
process, within a historical systems framework (Wallerstein 2004a). 
4 Gascoigne has a very traditional approach to history that is ‘Whiggish’ in nature: he 
uses twentieth century categories to describe pre-twentieth century practices in an 
evolutionary argument. However, we understand that concepts such as ‘scientist’, and 
indeed ‘science’ and therefore ‘scientific career’, are quite problematic as descriptors 
for the time-scale of the modern world-system. For instance, Shapin and Thackray 
(1974, p. 3) have written that ‘[t]o write the history of any period before ca 1870 
primarily in terms of such unqualified modern categories is to endanger the enterprise 
at its inception’ with ‘teleological assumptions’. However there are intellectual practices 
throughout the modern world-system that have come to be interpreted as contributing 
to the rise of what is now understood to be ‘modern science’. These are the practices 
we are concerned with in this study and for which Gascoigne provides relevant 
information in the form of systematically organised data. Thus while we problematise 
the modern categories that describe the intellectual practices that are implicated in ‘the 
rise of modern science’, we do argue there to have been a process that can be traced 
through the history of the modern world-system that we will categorise as ‘scientific 
practice’. While these earlier practices are not precisely ‘modern science’ since they 
occur in different social contexts, they do represent a lineage of work leading up to 
modern science. And it is this lineage that we study here: obviously just because 
‘science’ was not socially constructed as a concept until the late nineteenth century, 
this does not mean that practices that are now viewed as ‘scientific’ were not 
undertaken before the modern conceptualizations. We are interested in this lineage of 
practice, which for ease of presentation we call scientific practice. 
 3
Germany, and specifically Holland (Gascoigne 1992, pp. 556-559; Ben-David 
1971).5 Subsequently within northern Europe, it is Germany in particular that 
contributes most to the spectacular growth of ‘modern science’ in the later years 
of Gascoigne’s study. In this paper we break down Gascoigne’s national 
geographical categories into the actual urban places in which the science is 
practised.6 Further we map specific urban networks of science by focusing on 
the ‘career’ paths of one thousand ‘scientists’ that Gascoigne has identified as 
‘the most important in the period 1450-1900’ (1992, p. 548; Gascoigne 1987). 
From this source we are able to recreate some of the spatial dynamics that 
were integral to the practice of science as it grew to become and be central to 
modernity. 
 
The argument proceeds through three sections. First, we set out the parameters 
of our study within the context of the rise of historical geographies of science. 
We argue that our contribution is to bring in particular social theories that 
augment our understanding of the rise of science as a world-systems process. 
Second, we introduce the data we use, how we analyse it, and discuss different 
levels at which our results may be interpreted. Third, we present our findings on 
the spatial dynamics of the ‘career’ paths of leading scientists from 1500 to 
1900. This highlights the geographies of connections across Europe in ‘the rise 
of modern science’. 
 
 
Historical Geographies of Science 
 
David Livingstone (2005) has identified a geographical turn in science studies 
and this has been particularly the case for historical studies of science. In a 
recent review, Naylor (2005) specifies three such historical geographies of 
science: the microgeographies of science, the places where scientific activity 
occurs; the broader contexts in which science exists, defined by scale – these 
are city, region, national and international contexts; and cartographies of 
                                            
5 For more detail on the latter see Davids (2001). 
6 This is another way in which our study differs from the work of Ben-David; he uses 
national units of analysis without any systematic investigation of the urban places 
where science was practised (Ben-David 1971; Schott 1993, pp. 458-462). 
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science, the geographies within science discourses. Despite a conclusion that 
identifies a need to go ‘beyond place and culture’ (Naylor 2005, p. 11), this 
framework is a very place-orientated conceptualisation of geographies.7  He 
does note that there are ‘many other ways of thinking geographically about the 
history of science’ including thinking beyond ‘fixity’ to ‘movements and 
circulations that help sustain […] science’, but the latter is conspicuous by its 
absence from the substance of his review.8  This is a classic example of the 
tendency of much of the more humanistic approach in human geography to 
focus on place at the expense of flows.9 In this paper we take a more social 
science approach to our geography and bring flows to centre stage. 
 
A key understanding to derive from more humanistic approaches to the 
historical study of science is the diversity of roles that practitioners of science 
have played. Steven Shapin (2006) emphasizes this heterogeneity by showing 
how the ‘man of science’ has been cleric, government official, clerk, family tutor, 
domestic servant, gentleman, medical practitioner as well as university scholar. 
The meanings of the science being practised obviously varied with the roles 
being played: thus, according to Harris (2006, p. 346), it is ‘anachronistic to 
speak in terms either of a “scientific community” as a coherent group or of 
“scientist” as a professional designation during the early modern period’. There 
may have been no ‘scientific community’ as Gascoigne purports to measure, 
but this does not mean there were not collective practices of knowledge 
production.10 Shapin’s ‘man of science’ was also a ‘man of letters’, 
correspondence was very important: one of the Royal Society’s foundation 
                                            
7 We appreciate that the author provides ‘only a brief and broad introduction’ (p. 12) but 
it is in such limiting situations, where hard choices of inclusion and exclusion have to 
be made, that essential thinking is revealed. 
8 Powell (2007) similarly takes a largely place-orientated perspective in his review of 
geographies of science within and beyond the discipline of geography but points out 
the potential for future work on movement and circulation. 
9 Humanistic approaches to human geography were a reaction against studies of 
spatial models that reduced human beings to automatons (e.g. ‘economic man’). The 
critique involved replacing theories of space by meanings of place in which 
interpretation of people was much more complex and recognisably human.  This has 
carried over into studies of scientific practice through prioritizing place over flows but 
this is now changing: see Livingstone (2003), who discusses ‘Circulation: Movements 
of Science’ as one of three key ‘geographical modalities’ in his seminal exploration of 
geographies of science (the other being ‘Site: Venues of Science’ and ‘Region: 
Cultures of Science’). 
10 See footnote 4 above. 
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committees was the Correspondence Committee (Lux and Cook 1998). It is this 
communicative aspect of scientific practitioners, the ‘Republic of Letters’, that 
Harris (2006, pp. 347-348) focuses upon. Lux and Cook (1998) take a similar 
approach and highlight the problem of focussing on places with small groups, 
which they term ‘closed circles’. They argue for more attention being given to 
‘open networks’: the ‘assumption that all practices are local practices [is] 
undercutting the sense of a European-wide movement’ in early modern 
scientific practice (Lux and Cook 1998, p. 201). Thus while respecting 
heterogeneity amongst scientific practitioners it is important not to throw out the 
communicative baby with the community bathwater in studying the lineage of 
modern science. 
 
A key advantage of employing a social science approach to the historical study 
of science is that it gives access to pertinent social theory. For instance, Harris 
(2006, p. 354) in his discussion of the Republic of Letters draws upon Jürgen 
Habermas’s (1989) ideas to understand the overlapping and expanding 
networks of knowledge in early modern scientific practice as part of the new 
fabric of urban life that was the establishment of a public sphere.  Lux and Cook 
(1998) provide a particularly creative adaptation of a social theory to historical 
circumstances. They use Mark Granovetter’s (1973) social network model that 
salvages the specific importance of weak ties in diffusions of ideas. The 
argument is that strong ties tend to be inward looking (closed circles) that play 
little part in passing ideas on. In contrast weak ties are vital as efficient 
transmitters of ideas; being in between the closed circles, they form the vital 
links in the circulation of ideas. Lux and Cook show how the replacement of a 
more informal Paris institution by the new secretive Academy of Sciences in 
1666 led to a loss of weak ties through which Paris had linked the southern half 
of scientific Europe to the north. Properly applied, these studies show social 
theory can furnish useful tools for the historical study of science. 
 
We employ different areas of social theory from those reported above. As 
indicated at the start, our study is framed by Wallerstein’s world-systems 
 6
analysis.11 We are concerned to describe and analyse one important core-
making process: science practice. Our focus is on the creation of social spaces 
in the core zone of the modern world-system by agents (scientific practitioners) 
carrying out their (scientific) activities. Such activity reproduces spaces that 
sustain (scientific) trust between participants. In his general model of the 
production of social spaces, Manuel Castells (1996) identifies two types of 
social space: spaces of places and spaces of flows.12 In the former contiguity 
facilitates face-to-face interaction creating places of activity that generate trust. 
A market place is a classic such space; a laboratory is an equivalent scientific 
space. With spaces of flows trust is based upon indirect contact, distant 
communication through which trust is built up. Banking networks are a classic 
case of this form of space (you let your salary be paid to strangers); publication 
in a peer-reviewed journal is an equivalent example of a space of flows that 
sustains scientific practice. Of course, these two forms of social spaces do not 
exist in isolation; they need one another: places are constituted by flows (input, 
throughput, output); flows are organized through places (nodes).13 Therefore 
the research choice is not which space to study but rather which space to use 
as the starting point of analysis:14 choosing where to start prioritises one type of 
space over the other but does not necessarily neglect the space not chosen 
first. It is in this spirit that we use spaces of flows as the initial social space 
below. This is to focus on the dynamics before addressing the fixity: to recover 
historical networks and then to consider nodes in the network. 
 
                                            
11 Wallerstein employs a critical realist methodology that encompasses two main 
approaches: intensive research and extensive research (Sayer 1992). The former 
involves detailed study of the agents/actors who create the processes, whereas 
extensive research focuses on the broad patterns of (usually) quantitative data. 
Extensive research is often used as a prelude providing the statistical context for 
intensive research. This paper is an exercise in extensive social science; patterns of 
nodes and networks are described but the detailed interpretation of the agents in these 
places and flows is a further step towards improving understanding of the ‘rise of 
science’ that is not attempted here. 
12 Castells uses the two spaces to argue that contemporary globalization is 
characterised by spaces of flows dominating spaces of places as the key social space. 
We follow Giovanni Arrighi (1994) who shows that such an imbalance is not unique to 
the present; the concepts can be used as historical categories; see also Taylor (2007). 
13 The limiting cases of a purely fluid space of flows and a purely inert space of places 
do not exist in social relations; see Taylor (2007). 
14 See John Allen’s (1999) discussion on ‘city networks’ versus ‘networks of cities’. 
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Whereas spaces of places are observable as relatively neat maps, the study of 
spaces of flows is far messier: the myriad overlapping networks, chains, circuits 
and paths have been likened to dealing with a blizzard (Thrift 1999, p. 272). The 
Republic of Letters referred to above can be interpreted as part of just such a 
space of flows. In this study we research the ‘career’ paths of a population of 
scientists and aggregate them to show networks of workplace connections. This 
is an embodied space of flows that will have been a determinant of parts of the 
virtual Republic of Letters. The key advantage of dealing with aggregated 
‘career’ paths is that it provides a manageable universe of flows to delineate the 
geohistorical patterns in the ‘rise of modern science’ as a material space of 
flows.15
 
Social flows are articulated through nodes, in this case the workplaces of 
scientists. Materialist urban theory that treats towns and cities as places of work 
can be brought into play at this point. We will use the urban theory of Jane 
Jacobs (1969) to make some sense of what happens to urban settlements 
when scientists (a university) come(s) to town. Her argument is that a city is a 
place within overlapping networks associated with unique internal complexity: a 
highly diverse urban place is a successful dynamic city. Scientific activity may 
be important in this process because, in Naylor’s terms, as well as ‘science’ 
creating ‘spaces and places for its own activities’, it also ‘spatializes the world in 
a wide variety of ways’ (2005, p. 3). In other words, scientific activity can have 
influences beyond its own sphere. We use Jacobs’ theory of city complexity to 
provide a new take on the perennial town versus gown conflict over place. 
 
 
Data Construction and Analysis 
 
The data for this study come from Gascoigne’s (1987) chronology of the history 
of science. Part 2 of Gascoigne’s work, entitled ‘The Social Dimension’, 
provides ‘career’ sketches of one thousand scientists, selected from an earlier 
more comprehensive list (Gascoigne 1984). Inclusion in the ‘top thousand’ list 
was based on ‘the degree of importance accorded to each [scientist] in various 
                                            
15 Other relevant flows include academic travel. See, for example, Jöns (2008). 
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biographical dictionaries and encyclopaedias and in histories of the individual 
sciences’ (Gascoigne 1987, p. ix).16 While inevitably based on some subjective 
judgement, a comparison of statistical data derived from this source with 
Gascoigne’s (1984) original list and data compiled from the Dictionary of 
Scientific Biography shows a remarkable degree of consistency between the 
different sources (Gascoigne 1992). 
 
Biographical entries on individual scientists are arranged by country or region 
(Italy, France, Britain, Germany, Holland, Scandinavia, Switzerland, Eastern 
Europe, Russia, United States); within each territory, individual ‘careers’ are 
placed chronologically by decade of ‘career’ start. Entries vary in length but 
generally list workplaces by town or city. Often these refer to universities and 
other teaching institutions, but other sites of scientific engagement (courts, 
museums, botanical gardens, observatories etc.) are also listed. For data 
collection and analysis, we divided the available data into four centuries of 
major developments in the history of ‘modern science’ (Fig. 1). In practical 
terms, this temporal division ensures a large enough number of scientists in 
each period to enable an analysis of key shifts by workplace rather than 
nationality of the scientists. More importantly, although centuries are arbitrary 
time periods, in this case they do relate to different phases in the ‘rise of 
modern science’ as indicated by the labels attached to them in Figure 1. 
Subsequent spatial analyses will confirm the utility of this time frame.17
                                            
16 Of course, these sources are notoriously ‘Whiggish’ in nature (see footnote 4) but 
nevertheless they do provide relevant information for deriving a sample of relevant 
individuals who have contributed to the ‘rise of modern science’. In this way we employ 
a ‘collective biography’ or basic prosopographic approach through aggregating ‘career’ 
paths in knowledge production. This is the lineage of modern science described below. 
Like any empirical study the results are only as good as the data; in this case we treat 
Gascoigne’s massive encyclopaedic work as a reasonable starting point, while 
recognising that it could be improved. But that is for another research effort; the 
credibility of the results presented below do strongly suggest that Gascoigne provides a 
reasonable initial basis for describing the lineage of modern science.  
 
17 These centuries also broadly fit Wallerstein’s (1974, 1980, 1989) chronicling of the 
early modern world-system: creation centred on the sixteenth century (reorientation of 
Mediterranean economy), consolidation centred on the seventeenth century (rise of 
North West Europe especially the Dutch), rivalry centred on the eighteenth century 
(mercantile struggles), and expansion centred on the nineteenth century (industrial 
revolution). Note also that Figure 1 contrasts with Riddle’s (1993) data on university 
foundings (Figure 2, p. 55), which, as she points out (p. 55), show no relation to 
Wallerstein’s world-system cycles. Clearly scientific practice and the establishment of 
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Fig. 1 Growth of the ‘scientific community’, based on data in Gascoigne (1987, pp. 529-
535; amended version of Gascoigne, 1992, p. 551). Note: Number of ‘leading 
scientists’ by decade of ‘career’ start (three-decade moving average) 
 
We initially recorded the ‘career’ paths of listed scientists in a matrix that arrays 
scientists (columns) against workplaces (rows). For each century, one such 
matrix was created: 116 scientists x 61 places in the 16th century; 151 scientists 
x 85 places in the 17th century; 145 scientists x 88 places in the 18th century; 
and 422 scientists x 114 places in the 19th century. Each cell of each matrix 
records presence or absence of a scientist in a particular location during their 
‘career’. The chronology of ‘career’ stops is indicated by the sequence of 
allocated numbers (i.e. 1 for first workplace, 2 for second workplace etc.).18 In 
total, information was collected for 834 scientists for whom details of workplaces 
were available in the source.19 This basic information allows a crude 
reconstruction of individual ‘career’ paths. For the purpose of this study, we then 
converted each of the scientist x place matrices into a place x place matrix 
(ranging in size from 61 x 61 places in the 16th century to 114 x 114 places in 
the 19th century). Each cell in these inter-workplace matrices records, for the 
                                                                                                                                
universities are distinctive and separate processes, the latter being particularly 
influenced by political structures (Riddle 1993). For spatial patterns of university 
foundations from 1500 to 1800, see Frijhoff (1996, pp. 95-105). 
18 Return to a previous workplace was also listed. 
19 As we focus on the rise of modern science in Europe, information on US-American 
scientists (predominantly 19th century) was also excluded from the study. 
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respective century, the number of ‘career’ stops of leading scientists that link 
two specific locations.  
 
For each of the four analyses two sets of results are presented below. First, for 
each place we count the number of scientists who spent part of their ‘careers’ at 
that place. This provides a simple measure of the importance of a place; we will 
refer to it as the nodality of the place within the overall network. In this way the 
most important scientific workplaces can be identified for each century. Second, 
we focus on the dyads, pairs of places, and count the number of scientists 
whose ‘career’ paths encompassed both locations. In this way we can find the 
most important links between places. It is the latter that can be used to 
delineate the space of flows for each century. 
 
Finally, before we present our results it is necessary to say something about 
interpretation. The findings below can be considered at two levels. First, at a 
literal level, they show actual patterns of ‘career’ path characteristics over four 
centuries. This is interesting in its own right but ‘career’ paths in and of 
themselves are not our prime concern.20 Second, at an inferential level, the 
results represent a general patterning of the ‘rise of modern science’. Our 
conjecture is that our data and analysis indicates more than ‘career’ paths, they 
are surrogates for much broader processes. Whether this is substantiated 
depends on the robustness of the data, model and theory underpinning this 
extensive research. These have each been dealt with above but the proof is in 
the pudding so to speak. We know of no other mapping study that attempts to 
recreate a detailed urban geography of the ‘rise of modern science’ but we think 
our results are in line with what is known about this changing geography. 
 
 
Geohistories of Scientific Career Paths 
 
The basic geohistory of ‘modern science’ can be gleaned from the workplaces 
of leading scientists: Figure 2 shows the distribution of places where 
                                            
20 A large body of literature on the subject has developed since Eulenburg’s (1908) 
early study of academic recruitment in Germany. For an explicitly geographical 
perspective, see for example Meusburger (1990). 
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Gascoigne’s leading scientists spent parts of their ‘careers’ over four 
centuries.21
 
16th century 17th century
19th century18th century
Padua = 45
Paris = 33
London = 46
Berlin = 221  
Fig. 2 Workplaces of leading scientists, 16th – 19th centuries. Note: Workplace 
symbols proportional to place with most ‘career’ stops in each century; perceptual 
scaling of symbols; absolute numbers for top places are given in Tables 1-4 
 
                                            
21 One of the most obvious features of these maps is that they each have a wide 
distribution of scientists across Europe. And yet, during the four centuries they cover, 
developments in means of transport developed greatly, culminating in railways in the 
nineteenth century. But the nineteenth century map (Figure 2(d)) has roughly the same 
spread, with just a little expansion to the east. We know from merchant activities that 
travel was Europe-wide by the sixteenth century and scientists seem to have covered 
this same activity space throughout the times of this study.  
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For each map places are shown proportional to the place with the most ‘career’ 
stops. The patterns are not surprising but do reinforce our preconceptions of 
what was happening across Europe in terms of scientific practice. Clearly in the 
sixteenth century northern and central Italy dominate in a ‘primate’ pattern 
centred on Padua.22 Beyond this core region there are a string of places just 
north and west of the Alps plus Paris, the English Cambridge-London-Oxford 
triangle and a small German scattering. In the seventeenth century the pattern 
is very different: Padua continues to dominate in Italy but across the Alps there 
are four other important centres at London, Leiden, Paris and Jena. This is the 
only strong polycentric distribution we have uncovered in this research.23 By the 
eighteenth century Italian places have declined as scientific centres and Paris 
now dominates in a weakly polycentric pattern. Finally, in the nineteenth century 
there is a reversal to a primate pattern, now centred on Berlin with Germany in 
general dominating places of science. 
 
Table 1 Scientists’ movements through places in the sixteenth century 
Places Number 
Proportion 
of highest 
% of total
    
Padua 45 1.000 13.98% 
Montpellier 22 0.489 6.83% 
Rome 20 0.444 6.21% 
Bologna 18 0.400 5.59% 
Basel 18 0.400 5.59% 
Paris 15 0.333 4.66% 
Pisa 14 0.311 4.35% 
London 12 0.267 3.73% 
Wittenberg 11 0.244 3.42% 
Tübingen 11 0.244 3.42% 
Ferrara 11 0.244 3.42% 
Cambridge 11 0.244 3.42% 
Nuremberg 10 0.222 3.11% 
Oxford 8 0.178 2.48% 
Vienna 7 0.156 2.17% 
Lyons 6 0.133 1.86% 
Geneva 6 0.133 1.86% 
Jena 5 0.111 1.55% 
 
                                            
22 A primate settlement pattern occurs when one centre dominates – is much larger 
than – all the other places.  
23 A polycentric settlement pattern is where there are several roughly equal centres i.e. 
no one place dominates: it is the opposite of a primate distribution. 
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Table 2 Scientists’ movements through places in the seventeenth century 
City Number 
Proportion of 
highest 
% of total
    
London 46 1.000 9.75% 
Leiden 44 0.957 9.32% 
Padua 44 0.957 9.32% 
Jena 38 0.826 8.05% 
Paris 38 0.826 8.05% 
Oxford 33 0.717 6.99% 
Cambridge 26 0.565 5.51% 
Bologna 14 0.304 2.97% 
Wittenberg 14 0.304 2.97% 
Copenhagen 13 0.283 2.75% 
Rome 13 0.283 2.75% 
Amsterdam 12 0.261 2.54% 
Basel 11 0.239 2.33% 
Montpellier 8 0.174 1.69% 
Venice 8 0.174 1.69% 
Leipzig 6 0.130 1.27% 
Pisa 6 0.130 1.27% 
St. Andrews 6 0.130 1.27% 
Aberdeen 5 0.109 1.06% 
Florence 5 0.109 1.06% 
Hamburg 5 0.109 1.06% 
Rostock 5 0.109 1.06% 
 
Table 3 Scientists’ movements through places in the eighteenth century 
City Number 
Proportion of 
highest 
% of total 
    
Paris 33 1.000 9.54% 
Berlin 24 0.727 6.94% 
Leiden 22 0.667 6.36% 
Göttingen 21 0.636 6.07% 
London 16 0.485 4.62% 
St. Petersburg 15 0.455 4.34% 
Edinburgh 13 0.394 3.76% 
Halle 11 0.333 3.18% 
Padua 10 0.303 2.89% 
Uppsala 10 0.303 2.89% 
Bologna 9 0.273 2.60% 
Freiburg 8 0.242 2.31% 
Pisa 8 0.242 2.31% 
Pavia 7 0.212 2.02% 
Tübingen 6 0.182 1.73% 
Montpellier 5 0.152 1.45% 
Rome 5 0.152 1.45% 
Stockholm 5 0.152 1.45% 
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Table 4 Scientists’ movements through places in the nineteenth century 
Place Number 
Proportion of 
highest 
% of total 
    
Berlin 221 1.000 10.88% 
Munich 108 0.489 5.31% 
Göttingen 99 0.448 4.87% 
Heidelberg 97 0.439 4.77% 
Leipzig 94 0.425 4.63% 
Paris 93 0.421 4.58% 
Würzburg 92 0.416 4.53% 
Bonn 84 0.380 4.13% 
London 68 0.308 3.35% 
Zurich 59 0.267 2.90% 
Strasbourg 52 0.235 2.56% 
Königsberg 48 0.217 2.36% 
Vienna 45 0.204 2.21% 
Tübingen 43 0.195 2.12% 
Breslau 41 0.186 2.02% 
Giessen 41 0.186 2.02% 
Halle 40 0.181 1.97% 
Jena 39 0.176 1.92% 
Marburg 39 0.176 1.92% 
Edinburgh 36 0.163 1.77% 
Freiburg 36 0.163 1.77% 
Cambridge 33 0.149 1.62% 
Erlangen 33 0.149 1.62% 
St. Petersburg 32 0.145 1.57% 
Kiel 31 0.140 1.53% 
 
Part of the statistics from which these maps were drawn are given in Tables 1 to 
4 in which the leading places are listed. In Tables 1, 2 and 3, for the sixteenth, 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries respectively, the lists of top places 
include those where at least five leading scientists spent part of their ‘career’. 
Three pieces of information are given for each place: its scientist count, its 
proportion of the highest count, and its percentage of all scientist ‘career’ stops 
for the century. Thus in Table 1 the primacy of Padua is clear having more than 
twice as many scientific ‘career’ stops as Montpellier ranked second. 
Furthermore, Padua has almost 14% of all 322 ‘career’ stops we have recorded 
in the sixteenth century; this is by far the highest percentage we report for any 
century. The polycentricity of the seventeenth century is equally clear on Table 
2 with three places covered by a range of just two stops and another four places 
with over half the ‘career’ stops of the highest. Note that the percentages for 
overall stops, there were 472, are all below 10%. In the eighteenth century 
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(Table 3) the growth of scientific ‘career’ stops stalls with only 346 recorded. 
Paris has the highest, with three other places showing over half of Paris’s 
relatively low total. Note that Berlin in second place is the highest ranked 
German place thus far. In this case the low level polycentricity is further shown 
by the lowest percentages of total stops recorded in this study. Finally, in Table 
4 equivalent results for the nineteenth century are shown but with a total of 
2032 ‘career’ stops recorded, the cut-off point for listing a place is set at 30. 
This change of criterion reflects a transformation of scale in the practice of 
science in Europe in the nineteenth century. The table confirms Berlin’s primacy 
and Germany’s dominance: twenty of the places listed are German-speaking 
universities. Berlin also records a percentage of total ‘career’ stops second only 
to Padua in the sixteenth century. However it is somewhat short of the latter’s 
percentage reflecting a far broader network of university science places in the 
nineteenth century.  
 
The previous results show where scientific practices were taking place across 
the four centuries but do not show actual connections, dyad links between 
places. We have constructed a set of four maps that illustrate the changing 
space of flows through which ‘modern science’ has been constructed. The 
dyads we map are aggregates of ‘career’ links between places. In Figures 3, 4 
and 5, for the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries respectively, all 
dyads with at least two links in scientists’ ‘career’ paths are shown. In Figure 3 
sixteenth century European science is shown unmistakably as a network of 
links centred on Padua. Strongest links are found in Italy and in the English 
triangle but the latter is relatively isolated – Montpellier is clearly the second 
node of the network. In Figure 4 there is a clear expansion of the network, not 
just geographically across the Alps but as a strongly connected polycentric 
structure. Note that this diagram differentiates the main five centres as listed in 
Table 3. Although London is ranked first in terms of ‘career’ stops (Table 2) its 
position in the network is not so marked: the other four leading places all have 
more links than London, with Padua continuing to have most links overall, and 
Jena has by far the most strong links. London’s high number of ‘career’ stops 
(Table 2) is based simply on unusually close links within the English triangle 
during the scientific revolution. Figure 5 shows the eighteenth century pattern 
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that suggests a dissolution of the previous century’s space of flows. Here the 
network appears to be breaking up into four subnets: northern Italy just 
surviving, plus a mainly Paris-centred French net, a London-centred British net 
(including Scottish Enlightenment places and Leiden), and a more dispersed 
German net. There are only three dyads linking the subnets: Paris-Berlin, Paris-
Pavia, and Leiden-Göttingen. This looks very much like the end of a process. 
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Fig. 3 16th century networks of scientific practice. City codes for Figures 3-6: A1 
Amsterdam, A2 Avignon, B1 Basel, B2 Bath, B3 Berlin, B4 Bologna, B5 Bonn, B6 Breslau, 
C1 Caen, C2 Cambridge, C3 Copenhagen, D Dijon, E Edinburgh, F1 Ferrara, F2 
Florence, F3 Freiburg, G1 Geneva, G2 Giessen, G3 Glasgow, G4 Göttingen, H1 Halle, H2 
Heidelberg, H3 Helmstedt, J Jena, K1 Kiel, K2 Königsberg, L1 Leiden, L2 Leipzig, L3 
London, L4 Lyons, M1 Marburg, M2 Modena, M3 Montpellier, M4 Munich, N Nuremberg, 
O Oxford, P1 Padua, P2 Paris, P3 Pavia, P4 Pisa, R Rome, S1 St Petersburg, S2 
Stockholm, S3 Strasbourg, T1 Tübingen, T2 Turin, U Uppsala, V1 Venice, V2 Vienna, V3 
Vienne, W1 Wittenberg, W2 Würzburg, Z Zurich 
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Fig. 4 17th century networks of scientific practice. For city codes, see Fig. 3 
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Fig. 5 18th century networks of scientific practice. For city codes, see Fig. 3 
 
The diagram for the nineteenth century cannot use the same dyad size 
categories because of the scale of change: in Figure 6 all the dyads shown are 
in categories that were combined together in the largest category (over 6) in the 
previous three maps. This diagram emphasizes the primacy of Berlin and the 
dominance of Germany in a network pattern more definitively expressed than in 
any of the previous analyses. There is not just a change in scale, there is a 
qualitatively different network: a German-speaking net of universities that 
almost alone define the great growth of European scientific practice. Outside 
this major network only one other subnet appears – the English triangle plus 
Edinburgh as a very minor part of ‘modern science’ in nineteenth century 
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Europe. Overall Figure 6 represents the origins of the university-based ‘modern 
science’ that dominated worldwide scholarship in the twentieth century. 
 
O
K
2
B
6
M
1
S
3
B
5
M
4
L
2
H
2
G
2
C
2
G
4
K
1
L
3
M
3
T
1
V
2
W
2
Z
E
P
2
Berlin
14-18
10-13
7-9
6
 
Fig. 6 19th century networks of scientific practice. For city codes, see Fig. 3 
 
 
A Theoretical Excursion into Town-Gown Conflict 
 
University towns have a special place in the urban theory that is employed in 
this study. Active nodes in vibrant networks are expected to produce large 
successful cities (Jacobs 1969; Taylor et al. 2008). But consider the following 
places that feature in the tables and maps above: Cambridge, Erlangen, 
Giessen, Göttingen, Heidelberg, Helmstedt, Jena, Marburg, Modena, Oxford, 
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Pavia, St Andrews, Tübingen, Uppsala, Vienne, Wittenberg, and Würzburg. 
They are all small or medium sized urban places24 that have been on the 
demographic margins of the great urbanization revolutions that made Europe 
the most urbanized world region in the modern world-system by the end of the 
nineteenth century. And yet these places have all been relatively important 
centres for the development of ‘modern science’. The conundrum is, therefore, 
that since science is so important to modernity and the main demographic 
feature of modernity has been historically unprecedented high levels of 
urbanization, why have so many science centres not become major cities? 
There will be particular answers that can be given for every case above but 
given the quantity of cases, can there be a general explanation? 
 
The first point to make is that there are also some places referred to in previous 
analyses that are today large cities – Berlin, London and Paris are the obvious 
examples. But these exceptions prove the rule: they are places that have grown 
as multi-functional modern capital cities in which science practice has not been 
an overriding dimension. And that is the point: the 17 science centres listed 
above have all been dominated by the science workplaces that are universities. 
In Jacobs’ theory of economic expansion through cities the key process is 
diversification of division of labour to create complex economic entities.25 The 
converse of this is the ‘company town’. Such settlements might be efficient from 
the company point of view but their innate economic simplicity lessens 
opportunities for generating new work. Mill towns remain mill towns. Creating a 
new capital city is a similar one-function place production process that has 
created numerous politically-powerful but relatively small places (Abuja, 
Brazilia, Canberra, etc.): it took Washington, DC nearly two centuries to become 
a major US city because of its ‘company town’26 start (Abbott 1999). In other 
words, large clusters of scientists (i.e. universities) condemn their towns to likely 
never becoming important cities. University towns are company towns; like 
other ‘companies’ they thrive through monopolising power in relatively small 
                                            
24 All of these urban places have populations under 200,000 today. 
25 Jacobs (1969), see chapter 3 ‘Valuable Inefficiencies and Impracticalities of Cities’. 
26 Fifer (1981) actually referred to Washington, DC as ‘a company town’. 
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urban places at the expense of the economic expansion of those places.27 Thus 
Padua never became a Venice or Genoa, Leiden never became an Amsterdam, 
Uppsala never became a Stockholm, and Heidelberg and Würzburg never 
became a Hamburg or Munich. This monopolistic obstacle to economic growth 
is the essence of the town versus gown conflict.28
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have presented an extensive social science analysis of the ‘rise of modern 
science’ and briefly revealed one local economic effect of the rise. Starting with 
a northern Italian Renaissance centre of scientific practice based on Padua in 
the sixteenth century, the net expanded across the Alps to produce a Europe-
wide polycentric network in which the scientific revolution blossomed. This 
integrated net was dissipated to a large degree in the eighteenth century 
Enlightenment resulting in a disjointed network loosely centred on Paris. It was 
all change in the nineteenth century with the German invention of the modern 
university harnessing scientific research and totally dominating advanced 
scientific practice. Taking the story forward we can say that the Berlin-centred 
net expanded across the Atlantic to produce a worldwide polycentric science 
network in the twentieth century. If the model is extrapolated it suggests that in 
the current century this successful net’s organization will dissipate; we might 
argue that this is happening as scientific research leaves the university for new 
corporate masters in another qualitative change in the nature of scientific 
practice (Wallerstein 2004b). 
 
We began this paper setting out a world-systems frame that interweaves spatial 
core-periphery structures with knowledge structures and we conclude with a 
                                            
27 Our study ends in 1900, but it can be noted that in several cases, in the twentieth 
century, ‘town’ has been able to fight back successfully against ‘gown’ turning, for 
example, Oxford into a major motor manufacturer and Cambridge into a high tech 
centre in the recent economic climate where universities are keen to show they are 
economic assets rather than obstacles: spin-offs are demanded in return for high levels 
of state support. But historically universities have been severe obstacles to economic 
growth: that is why so many centres of science practice in our geohistory are small 
places. 
28 For an orthodox discussion of the town-gown conflict, see Brockliss (2000). 
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comment on what this research has confirmed about this approach. The ‘rise of 
modern science’ can be interpreted as an archetypal core-making process that 
has worked its way through the history of the modern world-system to become 
central to what ‘modern’ is. But it has a particular geography and this is not 
necessarily congruent with other core-making processes: there is no simple, 
spatially coherent bundle of core processes. The latter would imply a rather 
uniform core-zone of social practices and that, of course, has never been the 
case. The interesting divergence of the ‘modern science’ process from other 
core-making is to be found in the relative unimportance of Britain during the 
period of its hegemonic cycle (late eighteenth century through the nineteenth 
century).29 Britain was predominant in many things during its hegemony but not 
in ‘science’. This relates to our interpretation of the town-gown conundrum: it 
was not in Oxford and Cambridge that new practical technologies were created, 
rather the great cities of northern Britain such as Manchester, Birmingham and 
Glasgow were the vibrant cities underpinning British hegemony. Structures of 
knowledge are integral to the reproduction of the modern world-system in their 
own right, they do not simply mirror leading material and technological 
processes (Wallerstein 2004a).  
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